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Residue codes have successfully been used for decades as a low overhead
method of arithmetic error detection. This work explores the design space
of residue checking for error detection in processors with modern word sizes
and technology nodes. The area overheads of detecting arithmetic errors are
considered for a variety of processor configurations, ranging from those best
suited for embedded processors to those best for high-performance computers.
The ultimate goal of this work is to enable the study of low overhead arithmetic
error protection and correction in a wider variety of computer architectures
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This study focuses on the detection of transient errors in the arithmetic
datapath of modern microprocessors through the application of residue error
detecting codes. Errors in a processor can occur due to many sources, includ-
ing neutron strikes, electromagnetic interference, inconsistent supply voltage,
and degradation of materials over time [1]. The proper application of residue
checking can provide strong, comprehensive error protection of a processor
datapath irrespective of the duration or cause of an error—both permanent
faults and temporary errors can be reliably detected, as well as intermittent
errors due to design flaws or conditional variation.
The use of residue codes for error detection is relevant mainly to pro-
tect the arithmetic computation within a processor. Error protection in the
compute logic of a processor is becoming more important; soft-error rates are
rising with the number of transistors on chip, and the error vulnerability of
combinational logic may be increasing faster than that of memory or sequen-
tial elements [1, 2, 3]. Furthermore, soft errors in the execution path are the
most likely to produce fail-silent data violations, which are more insidious and
may be more dangerous than visible software malfunctions [4].
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The rest of the report is organized as follows. Section 1.1 gives a brief
introduction of error detection through residue codes. Section 1.1.1 provides a
more in-depth introduction to the field of error correcting codes, while empha-
sizing the relationship between the assumed error model with the overheads
and error coverage of residue checking. Section 1.1.2 gives an overview of the
costs and design parameters associated with error protection via residue codes,
and begins to transition over to the discussion of implementation overheads
and details. In Chapter 2, Sections2.1 and 2.2 explain the methodology and
describe the experimental platform, as well as the design of the circuit used for
the analyses. Section 2.3 reports the overheads found from applying a residue
code for error detection in the datapaths of three processors. Finally, some
future work is described and conclusions are summarized in Chapter3.
1.1 Residue Codes
Figure 1.1 shows an overview of the error detection process using residue
codes. Most arithmetic operations can be checked by testing the equality
of Equation 1.1, where |N |A = N mod A and ⊕ is the operation of interest.
If both sides of Equation 1.1 are equal, it is likely that no error has occurred.
If both sides are not equal, then some error has occurred. The coverage of a




∣∣|a|A ⊕ |b|A∣∣A (1.1)
The self-checking checker circuit shown in Figure 1.1 exists to both
2
check the result of computation, and to check its own conclusions—it is de-
signed to operate without fail even when the induced error happens within the
checker itself [5]. Specialized self-checking checkers exist for certain classes of
residue codes, as well as for the general case [6, 7, 8].
1
Figure 1.1: An overview of the residue code error detection process.
Residue codes are popular for their simplicity, for their low implemen-
tation overhead, for providing separability between the residue code and the
result of regular arithmetic, and for having provable properties under uni-
directional error models. We intend to investigate their novel application for
low overhead error detection and correction in modern processor architectures;
this report begins this work by applying residue checking to several processor
datapaths using modern word lengths, tools, and technology libraries.
3
1.1.1 Choosing an Appropriate Residue Code
In general, any number greater than one can serve as a residue code,
and any odd number will provide decent error coverage. However, this study
is restricted to a subset of low-cost residue codes, which are defined as
[rc ∈ 2n − 1, 2n;n ∈ N]. This form is chosen in order to allow the residue to
be calculated in an inexpensive manner [9, 10].
Choosing the best residue code for a given design is a non-trivial prob-
lem. It is a decision which depends on the error model adopted by the engineer,
and the amount of error detection ability sought. This section briefly discusses
the most popular error models, and provides a preliminarily investigation into
the cost of complete protection with residue codes, taking minimal assump-
tions about the errors themselves.
The arithmetic weight of an error, aw, is defined to be the number
of digits in a minimal binary signed-digit representation of the number. In
other words, the arithmetic weight of a number N is the minimum number of




n−2 + ... + a1r
1 + a0 (1.2)
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1.1.1.1 Concurrency of Errors
The first distinction to be made when classifying and categorizing er-
rors has to do with the concurrency of faults—whether a single or multiple
components in the circuit are expected to malfunction at the same time.
Single Event Upsets (SEUs):
The Single Event Upset (SEU) error model allows up to one component
in the fault resistant circuit to malfunction at a time. Given that the circuit is
protected against the incidence of SEUs, the circuit should guarantee correct
behavior with a high probability despite the faulty component. The single
event upset error model does not make any assumptions about the number of
perturbed bits at the output of a logic block, given a single disruptive event
within the logic itself. While specific fault injection research is needed for the
field of computer arithmetic, an analysis of an Alpha-like processor shows that
roughly 17% of SEUs in arbitrary logic result in multiple bit perturbations later
in the pipeline [4]. Algirdas Avizienis uses the terms local fault and distributed
fault to describe SEUs which propagate and are latched into one and multiple




Multiple event upsets are particularly difficult to protect against be-
cause they relax the assumption that only one component of the fault-resistant
circuit may fail at a time. This leads to a greater amount of redundancy needed
to make any guarantees about error coverage [12]. While classical error protec-
tion techniques, including residue checking, can deal with multiple faults in the
common case, there is further evidence that classical techniques may reduce
the incidence of multiple errors from ever occurring [11, 13]. For simplicity,
multiple event upsets are not considered in this study.
1.1.1.2 Error Model
In addition to the concurrency of expected errors, it is helpful to fit
a model to the nature of the errors themselves. There are some situations
where only errors of a certain type may occur, and a lower overhead error
detection or correction scheme may be applied as a result. There are three
general forms of errors which are of importance to arithmetic error detecting
codes [14]. They are shown below, in the order of the most restrictive model
to the least restrictive model being applied to the form of the errors.
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Asymmetric Errors:
Asymmetric errors may ever only induce 0→ 1 or 1→ 0 errors in the
output word. The type of error to expect is known beforehand. We do not
consider this type of error; it has been exhaustively covered and is of little
importance to the detection of transient errors in general.
Unidirectional Errors:
Unidirectional errors may induce either induce 0 → 1 or 1 → 0 errors
in the output word, but not both at the same time. In other words, a mal-
functioning unit under the unidirectional error model is guaranteed only to
corrupt 0 bits or 1 bits in the valid data at its output.
While it seems unintuitive, this error model is popular because it has
been shown that certain classes of errors, such as errors due to voltage droop
and errors induced in LSI memories, fall into this category [15]. Also, circuit-
level techniques exist which can make observing a unidirectional error more
likely [13].
Residue codes have been successfully modified to be unidirectional er-
ror detecting codes, by using the check |N |A′ = A − (N mod A) instead of
|N |A = N mod A [11]. Under an inverse residue code, Equation 1.1 changes to
resemble Equation 1.3. This type of error code is desirable for unidirectional
errors because an inverse residue code of width n (modulo 2n−1) is guaranteed
to protect against all unidirectional errors with an absolute arithmetic weight





∣∣|a|A′ ⊕ |b|A′∣∣A (1.3)
Symmetric Errors:
The model of symmetric errors makes no assumption about the direc-
tion of induced errors. The output word of a faulty component may have
suffered 0 → 1, 1 → 0, or both 0 → 1 and 1 → 0 errors simultaneously. Due
to the lack of studies targeting our technology and the degree of automated
circuit design used during the synthesis process, the symmetric error model is
most appropriate for this research.
1.1.1.3 Other Error Models
Some studies find it is useful to further divide the error landscape ac-
cording to the period of time that a fault manifests itself. However, these
classifications are not relevant to this study, which should be able to detect
errors of all time periods with equal probability.
1.1.1.4 Error Magnitude
The severity of an error is often expressed in literature in terms of the
arithmetic weight of the difference between the proper value, which would
have resulted from non-faulty execution, and the corrupted value. This can
be thought of as the Hamming weight of the non-adjacent normal form of
the distance. Given this analysis, it is evident that the expected arithmetic
weight of a completely random error E[aw] = m
3




. Figure 1.2 verifies these intuitions though simulation, by empirically
examining the distribution of the arithmetic weight of a randomly altered 64-
bit number.
In practice, errors induced by particle strikes in an m bit circuit rarely
approach the upper limit of m
2
, or even the expected value of m
3
. This is
because SEU errors do not often severely perturb the data, but rather prop-
agate to the outputs in an unpredictable, yet biased, way. Figure 1.3 shows,
through simulation, the arithmetic weights induced in a simple single-cycle
64-bit ripple-carry adder under the influence of an SEU. It can be seen that
|aw| ≤ 1, meaning this circuit always produces local faults in the event of a
single error. As such, the circuit is guaranteed to be protected by any odd
residue code. In general, the severity of errors induced at the output of a com-
ponent are the product of that component’s design, and where the error strike
occurs. Furthermore, the impact of SEUs may increase for any component
which operates over multiple cycles in a serial manner [11, 17]. Analysis of
component error susceptibility must be done on a circuit by circuit basis; this
has been done both analytically as well as through simulation in the past [11,
18, 19, 20, 3].
Because transient errors in circuits rarely approach their theoretical in-
tensity bound, it is difficult to predict the strength of error protection necessary
for an arbitrary circuit. Without making any assumption as to the magnitude
or sign of errors induced by an SEU, it is possible to provide complete cover-
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Figure 1.2: The arithmetic weight, aw, of a randomly altered 64-bit number.
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Figure 1.3: The arithmetic weight of an SEU in a simple ripple carry adder.
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both the error model and magnitude of errors.
Errors are missed with a single residue code when the difference between
the faulty value and the sought value is equal to a multiple of the check modulo.
The most practical way to completely protect a number with a residue code is
to use multiple relatively prime residues, which increases the effective period
of the residue check by the product of the residues. In order to completely
protect an m-bit number, one must choose k relatively prime residues such
that rk−1 ∗ rk − 2 ∗ ... ∗ r1 ∗ r0 ≥ 2m. This has obvious parallels to the field
of residue arithmetic, where multiple coprime residues are sought to perform
arithmetic with numbers of a certain dynamic range [21].
1.1.2 The Cost of Error Protection
The overall cost of implementing error detection with residue codes
depends on the amount of error detection coverage required, the circuits being
protected, and the types of errors to protect against. For a fixed detection
rate, error detecting codes can have a differing cost of implementation based
upon the context, form, and severity of faults that are expected. In addition,
the circuits that are protected influence the cost of error protection, both by
defining the appropriate error model as well as by requiring different operations
to be performed on the residue coded operands.
While residue codes are well-behaved under a unidirectional error model,
the error detection coverage of a given error code is less predictable for sym-
metric errors. Figure 1.4(a) demonstrates, through an analytical model, the
11
varied effectiveness of small low-cost residue codes at protecting against even
relatively minor symmetric errors. No assumption is made about the distri-
bution of the numbers that make up the erroneous bits, only the arithmetic
weights are defined. The erroneous bits are selected uniformly via sampling
without replacement, and their signs are randomly determined. All residue
codes can detect errors with aw = 1 unconditionally. In contrast, silent errors
with arithmetic weights of 2 are epidemic for single low-cost residue codes,
owning to the fact that every low-cost modulo, itself, has an arithmetic weight
of 2 [11]. In order to make any sort of reasonable expectation of error detection
rates, a fairly large residue code must be used.
Biresidues or multiresidue codes are a possible solution to both decrease
the failure rate for susceptible errors (those with aw = 2), as well as increase
the overall detection coverage of the residue code. Table 1.1.2 shows the error
coverage for a set of small low-cost residues, as well as the improved coverage
gained from using biresidue and multiresidue combinations of these numbers.
It can be seen that combinations of residues perform approximately as well
as the residue nearest the product of their parts. Exhaustive simulation ver-
ifies that, for any m-bit number, any combination of residues whose product
is greater or equal to the dynamic range of 2m will provide complete error
coverage. It should be noted that complete error coverage for detection may
be wasteful in the common case where some orthogonal mechanism is used for
recovery, and a weaker error model may be assumed.
For comparison, Figure 1.4(b) demonstrates the use of inverse residue
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Table 1.1: Combinations of residues can be used to improve detection accu-
racy for small low-cost residue codes. The detection accuracy of several small
residues, combinations of residues, and larger residues is shown.








(3,5) ≈ 15 0.98356 0.99540
(2,3,5) ≈ 31 0.99230 0.99846
(2,3,5,7) ≈ 255 0.99952 0.99998
codes, which are often applied for their ability to strengthen error detection.
It can be seen that the inverse residue code successfully detects all error inten-
sities, but still requires a large residue code to detect all errors. However, our
results confirm the previously derived findings that the inverse residue codes
provide unambiguously better coverage than do normal residue codes, though
they do not provide any better guarantees for symmetric errors [11]. While it is
not directly tied to this study, Appendix A verifies the (guaranteed) behavior
of inverse residue codes under a unidirectional error model.
The implementation cost of different moduli is an orthogonal area of
concern when designing an error detecting system. Figure 1.5 shows the rel-
ative area and delay of different 64-bit low-cost residue circuits. In order
to generate a spectrum of results, the flexible delay-optimized parallel prefix
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adder from the Synopsys DesignWare library is used, and all possible design
points are identified by the compiler while optimizing for area under different
delay constraints.
There are several notable results from the area/delay analysis. It is
apparent that given no delay constraint, any width of modulus costs the same
area—in general, the tradeoff exists between spending area on logic (for large
moduli), or interconnect (for small moduli). As expected, a power-of-two
modulus typically is computed more cheaply than a low-cost (odd) modulus,
since normal twos compliment adder trees may be used. Also, larger moduli
typically require a moderate amount more area than a smaller modulus to
achieve the same delay. However, at least for the DesignWare component
libraries, some adders get more efficiently compiled than others, such that
for a strict delay budget, a larger modulus (typically m
2
) may be the best
choice. The added complexity and power due to propagating a larger modulus
throughout the residue arithmetic and checking circuitry is not included in
this analysis, however.
This study, focuses on single event upsets, which induce symmetric er-
rors somewhere at their output after propagating through logic. For simplicity,
and to mimic prior studies, a modulo 3 generator and checker is implemented.
This should provide decent, yet not complete, coverage for SEUs that strike
the circuit [22, 18]. The overheads associated with a stronger residue check
modulus, 255, which has a much higher coverage than modulo 3, are also pro-
vided. Finally, the added cost to provide complete error protection using a
14
combination of 3 moduli is investigated. The moduli chosen to achieve our




2 − 1, 7 for an m-bit word length) are selected
using the systematic method proposed in prior literature [10].
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2.1 Framework and Methodology
Part of this research is to develop the infrastructure to conduct mean-
ingful circuit-level architectural studies of resiliency techniques in the future.
Towards that end, we have begun developing a platform for early design ex-
ploration, functional verification, and automatic timing and power analysis.
This platform is composed of a parametrized library of residue components,
which support a variety of word and input widths. This platform also has a
series of scripts for automatic testbench creation (with exhaustive or random
inputs), and the exploration of the timing and delay characteristics of a design.
Automatic generation of user-annotated switching activity for power analysis
is also supported, though power analysis is absent from this study due to time
restrictions.
Empirically, this study focuses on the implementation of residue check-
ing in three modern processor datapaths, which are described in Table 2.1.
The Synopsys DesignWare IP library was used for the designs, and synthe-
sis was performed using the Synopsys toolchain, targeting the 45nm Nangate
Open Cell Library [23, 24]. All designs are compiled using the Synopsys Design
18
Table 2.1: The datapaths which were implemented and analyzed.




Compiler with the -map_effort medium and -area_effort high optimiza-
tion flags.
2.2 Implementation Details
Our implementation of residue checking focuses in part on the moduli
of the form 2n − 1, In order to calculate this class of low-cost residue in a
single cycle, a parallel tree of wrap-around-carry adders was used, as can be
seen in Figure 2.1(a). A simple general implementation of a wrap-around carry
adder is found in Figure 2.1(b).
1
(a) 1 ≡ 214 mod 3
1
(b) Wrap-Around Adder
Figure 2.1: Taking the residue of a number with a low-cost residue code, and
a possible implementation of a wrap-around carry adder.
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In order to simplify the error detection process, the ALU, shifter, and
a multiply-accumulate unit (MACC) are logically grouped into a higher-level
entity called the execution unit (EXU). A circuit-level diagram depicting the
residue code checking process is given in Figure 2.2. In lieu of having a special-
ized EXU which operates under modular arithmetic, the residue of the output
is taken from a reduced normal EXU. This design differs from Figure 2.2 only
in that it is pipelined, to represent the flow down a normal datapath. A cycle
time of 2ns = 500MHz is targeted for all designs, with a single-cycle MACC
unit. This represents a moderately fast design point, after which large penal-
ties are incurred to gain further speed. An error is detected at the beginning
of the second stage following the output of the EXU, which is one full cycle
after the completion of the multiplier, and two full cycles after the completion
of the shifter and adder.
The EXU design is based upon the interface of the OpenSPARC T1
and a residue hardened ALU by Kinniment, Sayers & Chester [25, 26]. The
ALU, shifter, and MACC units are fully parametrized using the Synopsys
DesignWare library.
The implementation of Figure 2.2 presented in this study does not
have a self-checking checker to test for equality between the separable halves
of our error code word. A simple XOR-based equality check is substituted,
due to time constraints. A small amount of miscellaneous overhead is added to
approximate missing features of the design, including the self-checking checker.
Future implementations of this datapath will have a self-checking checker;
20
Table 2.2: The supported EXU interface and operations.
EXU ADD SFT/ROT MACC Functional Unit Operation
000 X X X Control Pass A
001 X X X Control Pass B
010 X X X Control Pass 1

































Figure 2.2: An unpipelined, circuit-level diagram of the residue checking error
detecting scheme.
the results presented here should be considered as a rough estimate of the
overheads for a tuned, totally self-checking residue code circuit.
The overheads of complete error protection are approximated through
the use of the multiresidues found in Table 2.2. These moduli are chosen
in order to minimize the area of our targeted design, by using the insights
that the 2n modulus should be as large as possible, and that a large low-cost
22
Table 2.3: The moduli chosen to implement complete error detection.
Word Length Modulo 1 Modulo 2 Modulo 3
16 7 28 − 1 28
32 7 216 − 1 216
64 7 232 − 1 232
modulus of the form 2
m
2 − 1 has an efficient implementation in our design.
In addition, these designs are optimized for moduli that evenly divide the
machine word length, and odd moduli suffer a corresponding area penalty.
Further optimizations for odd-width low-cost moduli may change the choice
of coprime bases in the future.
2.3 The Overheads of Error Detection
Table 2.4 shows the estimated area overheads of our residue checking
error detecting implementation. The selected moduli can be thought of as
providing an approximate lower and upper bound on the possible spectrum
of implementation overheads, due to their all-encompassing natures. It is ap-
parent that the residue generation units dominate the area cost for embedded
processors, whereas residue arithmetic and assorted other checking costs be-
come more prevalent with larger machines. In embedded processors, the high
cost of generating the residues at each functional unit can be mitigated by
propagating coded outputs between multiple protected units in the datapath.
However, in this case, parity checking is needed at the inputs to ensure the
absence of transmission errors [18, 27]. Assuming a reasonable overhead for
23
parity checking at the inputs, this reduces the overhead of protecting a 16-bit
EXU with a modulus of 3 from about 35% to about 25% of the original area.
In general, the relative cost of residue checking is much higher on the
embedded processor than on the machine modeling a high performance sci-
entific processor. This is mainly because the area of the EXU increases non-
linearly with word size, as can be seen from Figure 2.3. This is not due to the
aggressive targeting of a 2ns cycle time—it can be seen that this frequency
is right at the area of diminishing returns for all processors. Rather, it is
symptomatic of the necessary scaling of the logic itself.
The high overhead associated with complete error detection indicates
that it would not be competitive against other architectural techniques, such
as duplication, which are able to detect errors regardless of the error model.
However, the information contained in the moduli for complete error detection
is sufficient to provide an architectural mechanism for concurrent error correc-
tion [28]. The error correcting aspect of multiresidue codes, while unexplored
in this paper, may justify the large overheads required for complete detection.
In addition, any small relaxation of the requirement for complete error cov-
erage greatly reduces the required overheads—being able to tolerate just one
possible error over the entire dynamic range of a number halves the amount
of information that the residue code must contain. Due to the nature of er-
rors and the rate at which error detection increases with error code widths,
it is possible to provide a high degree of error protection for most machines
with a moderately sized residue code with a reasonably low overhead. This is
24
Area, Library UnitsDelay,ns 1.52.02.53.03.54.04.523456782468101214 10000 20000 30000 16−bitEXU32−bitEXU64−bitEXU EXU Width16−bit EXU32−bit EXU64−bit EXU
Figure 2.3: The relative area and delay of different EXU designs.
25

































































































































































































































































































































































Future Work and Conclusion
3.1 Prior Work
Residue codes are part of a class of arithmetic error control codes,
which are preserved under arithmetic operations. Residue codes were chosen
over other arithmetic codes, such as AN codes, for the simplicity and separa-
bility of their design [29]. Nonarithmetic error codes may also be applied to
integer operations through a process called check prediction. Parity codes [29],
checksum codes [30], parity-based linear codes [31], and Berger codes [32] have
been successfully applied to arithmetic. These techniques were eschewed for
residue checking due to its low cost of application. In addition, there are many
different architectural, software and circuit mechanisms which can detect and
correct transient errors in a processor; it is not within the scope of this report
to attempt to describe any of them.
Because of their relatively low overhead and good separability, residue
codes have enjoyed popularity in the commercial sector. Multipliers, in partic-
ular, are often protected by residue checking because of the efficient implemen-
tation it allows [33, 18]. Some notable error detecting implementations include
the application of parity prediction and residue codes in the STAR computer
28
and a residue checking processor by Kinniment, Sayers & Chester [34, 26].
In addition, IBM has a long history of putting both parity prediction as well
as residue checking into their chips, including the System/9000 processor and
vector co-processor, the IBM eServer z900, the IBM eServer z10, and the
Power6 [17, 35, 36, 37].
3.2 Future Work
Future work will analyze the power overheads of residue checking, sim-
ilar to the area analysis presented in this report. The experimental infrastruc-
ture which aids the area exploration can mostly be shared with power studies;
however, the added work required to simulate workloads and gather traces of
switching activity for dynamic power estimation prevented us from presenting
any meaningful power results in this report.
There is still remaining work to be done in the basic design of the residue
checking datapath. The self-checking checker needs to be implemented, and
the totally self-checking nature of the circuit should be verified. In addition,
there are many unexplored areas which can be tuned to reduce the area, and
most likely power, of our design. Some possibilities include:
1. Pipelining the datapath logic, or splitting the residue logic, to allow a
better balancing of the residue pipeline stages.
2. Further relaxing the semantics for error detection latency in order to
allow a simplified and more deeply pipelined residue checking design.
29
3. Optimizing our low-cost residue code generation for the case when base
widths do not divide evenly into the machine word length.
4. Coupling the control of multiresidue EXUs in a SIMD-style manner, to
reduce control overheads.
From previous literature and the overheads observed in the initial re-
sults, it is obvious that (1) error detection overheads scale favorably with the
machine word size, (2) logic for modular arithmetic and result checking domi-
nates the cost of residue checking in systems with strong protection. An area of
future study which will be explored is the targeted application of residue check-
ing to SIMD computer architectures. All execution units in a SIMD machine,
by construction, perform the same operation, such that the inputs and outputs
of each may be treated as a very long word. If overflow between the packed
operands is handled in the same manner as with normal residue checking, then
the resulting residue codes are still preserved under arithmetic operations. Fig-
ure 3.1(a) and Figure 3.1(b) illustrate this concept. Breaking traditional EXU
boundaries has the effect of increasing the cost of residue creation; the modi-
fied circuit has double the number of adders spent on residue generation and
probably roughly doubles the area spent in this domain. However, treating
a SIMD word as one long input greatly reduces the number of check EXUs
and self-checking checkers which are required. An n wide SIMD circuit only
requires one of each (instead of n), which becomes especially valuable for large
input moduli or large (packed) machine word lengths. In addition, the reduc-
tion of error detection costs may make this approach practical for smaller word
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length machines, which are typically expensive to protect with residue codes.
Also, this scheme may make very strong error protection practical, whereas
it is prohibitively expensive to protect a single EXU completely via residue
codes. Two things seem to make strong error protection more practical in the
SIMD scheme. First, as this study has shown, the cost of strong error protec-
tion is dominated by the modular arithmetic and checkers, whose aggregate
overhead may be greatly reduced. Also, an SEU, even in the general case, is
guaranteed not to transcend the fixed SIMD packed unit boundaries. There-
fore, in an intelligently applied residue checking scheme, one may be able to
detect (and perhaps correct) any single digit error in a manner which scales
favorably with the number of SIMD lanes.
3.3 Conclusion
This work is not meant to represent a novel development in the field of
residue arithmetic or error control codes; also, this is far from the first study to
implement an error detection system using residue checkers. The goal of this
work is to develop a platform and body of knowledge which will enable the
study of low overhead arithmetic error protection and correction in a wider va-
riety of computer architectures. This report represents the first step towards
developing such infrastructure. A broad overview of residue codes is given,
while stressing the importance of explicitly recognizing the different error mod-
els. The nature of expected errors is, by far, the most important parameter
when designing an efficient residue checked circuit. As has been shown, the
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difference is huge between the area overhead required for the weakest low-cost
residue code (23 − 1) and an error code providing complete coverage of any
error.
An orthogonal contribution of this work is the description of an ex-
perimental platform for the empirical study of residue checking in modern
processors. A parametrized model of a residue checker has been developed,
a basic tools have been created to aid in design space exploration and fault
injection. Ultimately, we hope to use these tools in order to apply low over-




(a) Näıve Application of Residue Codes
1
(b) Breaking Traditional EXU Boundaries
Figure 3.1: A possible future area of exploration: the efficient application of





Residue Checking in a Unidirectional Channel
As is mentioned in 1.1.1.2, an inverse residue code of width n (modulo
2n−1) is guaranteed to protect against all unidirectional errors with an absolute
arithmetic weight of less than or equal to (n− 1). For completeness, and
to verify the functionality of our error injection framework, the behavior of
residue codes and inverse residue codes is simulated in a unidirectional channel
under a uniform error assumption. This experiment is analogous to that which
produced Figure A.2(a) and Figure A.2(b), only under a unidirectional instead
of symmetric error model.
It can be seen that the correctness guarantee of inverse residue codes
is maintained, and that inverse residue codes provide higher overall error de-
tection rates. There are, theoretically, some errors which will fail for normal
residue codes such that they do not hold the same bounded correctness guar-
antee as the inverse residue codes. However, not enough of such errors occured
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